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Stuck in the Middle Revisited 
STUCK IN THE MIDDLE REWSITED: THE CASE OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY 
Isabelle Dostaler and Triant Flouris 
Abstract 
When Porter (1 980) introduced his typology of business strategies, he used Laker Airways' as an example to illustrate 
the danger of being stuck in the middle between the two basic types of competitive advantage, namely low cost and 
differentiation. However, the changing nature of competitive pressure in many business sectors and the accompanying 
need to perform well simultaneously in several aspects of operations performance, have eventually lead Porter (1 990) 
to revisit his early idea. When presenting Porter's generic competitive strategies, most strategy textbooks now offer 
a new choice, namely the "integrated cost leadershiptdifferentiation" strategy (Coulter, 2002; Hitt, Ireland, & 
Hoskisson, 2003), or the "best-cost provider" strategy (Thompson & Strickland, 2001). Given this background, the 
purpose of this theoretical paper is to build upon the strategic management and operations strategy literature to 
develop a conceptual framework that will subsequently be used to explore the extent that airline companies 
successfully pursue the best-cost provider (or integrated cost leadershiptdifferentiation) strategy, and how they manage 
to resolve the trade-off between low-cost and differentiation. We aim at revisiting the "stuck in the middle" 
prescription by demonstrating that a number of aviation strategic options exist between the ''traditional'' and "low- 
cost" model. 
lntroduction 
In many industrial sectors, competitive pressure now 
requires companies to compete on several dimensions 
simultaneously. Rather than choosing between an ensemble 
of key performance criteria, companies should aim at 
achieving them all. Indeed, fiom a customer's point of view, 
the obvious choice would be, for example, audio equipment 
offering both performance and ease of use, or cars offering 
both speed and safety. Similarly, when given a choice, a 
traveller will opt for a carrier that is able to offer high 
service quality, on-time arrival, and low fares. These 
examples illustrate the perspective that argues against 
Porter's "stuck in the middle7' prescription that inherent 
contradictions exist between the generic competitive 
strategies, namely the cost-leadership, cost-focus, 
differentiation, and focused differentiation strategies. This 
critique was echoed in the field of operations management 
where the traditional idea that the operations function should 
be designed to achieve a limited number of performance 
criteria, for example low-cost vs. flexibility, has been 
questioned. 
The purpose of this theoretical paper is to build on the 
strategic management and operations strategy literature to 
develop a conceptual h e w o r k  that will subsequently be 
used to explore the extent that airline companies will 
successfully pursue the best-cost provider (or integrated cost 
leadershipldifferentiation) strategy and how they manage to 
resolve the trade-off between low-cost and differentiation. 
Theoretical Background 
Generic Competitive Strategies 
Strategy can be formally envisioned as a hierarchy 
reflecting the organizational structure of multidivisional 
corporations (Grant, 1998) in which corporate strategy states 
the general direction that the organization will follow, while 
business strategy is a formulation of how the business unit 
intends to compete in its given business sector. The lower 
level of this hierarchy of plans reveals the instrumental 
character of functional strategies designed to support the 
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implementation of the business and corporate strategies. 
Strategists or dominant coalitions have a number of 
corporate strategic options such as concentration, vertical or 
horizontal integration, and diversification available to them, 
that can be realized through strategic alliances, mergers, 
* acquisitions, or internal development. 
Whereas the business sectors in which the fm will be 
active are selected at the corporate strategy level, business 
strategy decisions dictate how each business unit will 
compete in its specific business sector. In an attempt to 
explain and categorize specific com~etitive strategies that 
firms use, researchers have proposed typologies of business 






strategic postures are possible: prospector, defender, 
analyser, and reactor. Porter (1980) argued that two types of 
competitive advantage exist that can be combined with 
either a broad or limited competitive scope to create four 
well-known business strategies: cost leadership, 
differentiation, focused low-cost, and focused differentiation 
(Figure 1). After identifiing an industry that is considered 
to be attractive, a firm will determine how to position itself 
within the industry. This explains why Mintzberg classified 
Porter's contribution in the "positioning" school of thought 
(Mintzberg, 1998). 
Competitive Advantage 
Lower Cost Differentiation 
Figure I. Four competitive strategies 
(Source: Porter, 1980). 
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Cost leadership is the typical business strategy pursued 
by companies in the consumer electronics or compact cars 
industries. Each one of the cost leader's value chain 
activities has to be conducted in the most efficient way in 
order to generate a profit margin despite the low price of the 
product or service offered. In contrast, differentiation is the 
business strategy of companies that offer a product or 
service that customers perceive as different and for which 
they are willing to pay a higher price. Selecting the bases of 
differentiation, in other words the features of the product or 
service offered or the way in which it is offered, and 
developing the organizational capabilities needed to achieve 
the bases of differentiation, is a key challenge for 
companies. Interestingly, in order to ensure offering 
acceptable value to customers, cost leaders must not ignore 
the bases of differentiation valued by customers and for 
which they are willing to pay a premium. However, cost 
leaders must not try to offer features that differentiated 
products or services possess, for fear of being "stuck in the 
middle". ~ c c o r d k ~  to Porter (l980), this is what happened 
to Laker Airways in the 1970s. The British airline offered a 
successful no fiilVlow fare service but eventually started to 
add more destinations and fancier in-flight services. To 
maintain it. profitability, Laker Airways had to raise its 
fares up to the point where travellers felt that they had more 
value for money when flying with traditional carriers. 
According to Porter, a firm that tries to pursue each generic 
strategy but fails to achieve any of them is 'stuck in the 
middle'. Porter (1990) saw such a position as "a 
manifestation of a furn's unwillingness to make choices 
about how to compete," @. 69) and argued that being stuck 
in the middle was "a recipe for strategic mediocrity and 
below-average performance, because pursuing all the 
strategies simultaneously means that a fm is not able to 
achieve any of them because of their inherent 
contradictions" (Porter, 1990, p.40). More precisely, 
achieving both low cost and differentiation was thought to 
be "difficult because providing unique performance, quality, 
or service is inherently more costly, in most instances, to 
seeking only to be comparable to competitors on such 
attributes" (Porter, 1990, p.38). 
Operations Strategy 
The above discussion on generic competitive strategies 
seemed to imply that when formulating a business strategy, 
managers may choose from a "menu" of generic options. 
The literature on functional strategies is less centred around 
content and is therefore keeping with the Harvard approach 
to business policy that considers each company's situation 
as unique (Greiner, Bhambri, & Curnmings, 2003). 
Combined to form what is fashionably referred to as a 
"business model", functional strategies are often defined as 
"patterns of decisions" (Wheelwright, 1984, p.79), putting 
in action the formulated corporate and business strategies. 
Marketing strategy, human resource strategy, research and 
development strategy, and operations strategy are examples 
of functional strategies. A human resource strategy will 
consist of a set of decisions regarding staffing, training, 
compensation, performance appraisal, etc. An airline 
operations strategy could include decisions regarding 
service design, demand forecasting, capacity management, 
service operations, planning schedule, and service quality 
management. Mintzberg (1987) has distinguished between 
intended and realized strategies, explaining that a 
company's actual strategies are a combination of intended 
and emergent strategies. Not all intentions are realized 
because some are discarded within the course of action. 
Since they are defined as decisions already taken, it could be 
argued that functional strategies go beyond strategic intent 
(Hamel & Prahalad, 1989) and are good indicators of a 
firm's realized business strategy. 
The field of operations strategy was dominated by the 
trade-off model for a long time; The operations function 
should not try to be all things to all people and the 
functional decisions described above (capacity, equipment 
and processes, etc.) should be taken with a limited set of 
criteria in mind (Skinner, 1969). As a result, a factory or 
service delivery system, designed to achieve low cost, could 
not be flexible and lower quality could also be expected. 
The operations function should select one or two 
competitive priorities and develop manufacturing or service 
capabilities accordingly in order to support the choice 
between a cost and a differentiation strategy made at the 
business level. Indeed, the trade-off model is quite in line 
with Porter's "stuck in the middle" argument presented 
above. Now that the changing nature of the competitive 
pressure in many industrial sectors, and the accompanying 
need to perform well in several aspects of operations 
performance have become a global reality, some operations 
management authors have suggested adopting a cumulative 
viewpoint of operational performance (Ferdows & De 
Meyer, 1990). Interestingly, this has happened in a context 
where scholars in the field of strategic management were 
questioning the exclusivity of low cost and differentiation 
(Kotha & Vadlamani, 1995; Hayes & Pisano, 1996). 
Ferdows and De Meyer's "sand cone model" is 
increasingly referred to as the first formal proposition of an 
alternative to the trade-off theory. Most authors in the field 
now recognize the trade-off model and the "cumulative" or 
"synergies" approach as two competing schools of thought 
(Corbett & Wassenhove, 1993; Noble 1995; Clark, 1996; 
- 
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Collins, Cordon & Julien, 1998; Flynn, Schroeder & Flynn, 
1999; Dostaler 2000). The notions of "sequence" and 
"lasting capabilities" are key elements in Ferdows and De 
Meyer's model which is illustrated by a sand cone; pouring 
sand to build a cone is like putting in managerial effort and 
resources. The authors argue that since improvements in 
quality precede successive improvements in dependability, 
speed of response, and, in the end, cost, all these 
improvements (or lasting capabilities) can last (Figure 2). 
Research conducted by others has confirmed this view of 
quality as being the basis of improvements in other 
performance areas (Noble, 1995; Flyhn et al., 1999; Dostaler 
2000). However, as empirical evidence is scant for the 
remaining stages of the proposed sequence of 
improvements, one cannot but wonder if such a sequence 
really exists. It could be argued that improvements happen 
in a more disorganized manner, with various virtuous 
circles, and some vicious ones, at work, everywhere in the 
production or service delivery system. For example, the 
implementation of JIT in manufacturing companies may 
lead to improvements in quality because solutions to quality 
problems that appear suddenly must be found (Wilbson & 
Oliver, 1989). Similarly, improvements in quality also 
increase productivity as less re-work is needed. The idea of 
the multiple impact of a given practice is hardly debatable. 
However, the hypothesis of a fixed sequence of 
improvements may be less convincing. 
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"Stuck in the Middle" Revisited 
The "stuck in the middle" prescription, like the trade-off 
model, has generated much debate. We mentioned earlier 
that functional strategies are instrumental in character since 
they are designed to support the implementation of business 
, and corporate strategies. Using Mintzberg's (1987) concept 
of realized and intended strategies, we suggested that 
fhctional strategies constitute valid indicators of the actual 
business strategy pursued by a firm. The similarity between 
the debates on the trade-off model in the field of operations 
management and on the stuck in the middle prescription in 
the field of strategy is a further indication of the close 
relationships between levels of strategies. For example, 
Gilbert and Strebel (1988) did not consider cost leadership 
and differentiation as mutually exclusive and argued that 
companies in mature industries can rejuvenate themselves 
by shifting to product differentiation and innovation, whilst 
preserving strengths in cost reduction and process 
efficiency. Interestingly, this is reminiscent of Ferdows and 
De  eyer's idea of lasting capabilities that pushed the 
operations management field to question the inescapability 
of operational performance trade-offs. Similar arguments 
could be found with Pettigrew and Whipp who observed that 
in many industrial sectors, bases of competition in one era 
became the essential prerequisites for new organizational 
capabilities in the next. They stated that "the popular notion 
of a single competitive edge appears at best wrong-headed 
and at worst downright alarming" and stressed the danger of 
"pinning all hopes and resources on one main ability" 
(Pettigrew & Whipp,l991, p.289). This strong argument 
echoed the "value for money" paradigm introduced by 
Pitelis and Taylor (1996) who are considered as fervent 
advocates of the need for companies to try to achieve both 
cost leadership and differentiation (Kanitakis, 2002). 
Contributing to the debate on whether cost leadership and 
differentiation can be combined, Cronshaw, Davis and Kay 
(1 994) have proposed new interpretations of the "stuck in 
the middle" prescription. They suggested that f m s  that do 
not establish lower costs or better or differentiated products, 
overall rarely succeed. Interestingly, this interpretation 
suggested that "stuck in the middle" was less a prescription 
than a way to analyze strategic outcomes. Indeed, analyzing 
strategic outcomes is precisely what Porter does in his 1990 
book The Competitive Advantage of Nations when he used 
the global shipbuilding industry to describe the generic 
strategies. He explained how Japan, Korea, Scandinavia, 
and China each have successfully pursued one of the four 
competitive strategies and argued that Spanish and British 
ship-building industries have declined because they were 
stuck in the middle (Porter, 1990, p.39). Interestingly, 
Page 38 
Cronshaw et al. argued in 1994 that the weaknesses of 
British yards "were in the implementation of the strategy": 
British shipbuilders failed not because they 
pursued the wrong strategy, but because 
they were not very good at building ships. 
In this context, the claim that they were 
'stuck in the middle' is best interpreted as 
meaning that they did not succeed in 
establishing any competitive advantage. 
We infer that they were 'stuck in the 
middle' lkom the evidence of their failure. 
In this case, we would not interpret the 
phrase 'stuck in the middle' as refening to 
strategies, intentions or goals, .but to 
strategic outcomes. (pp.22-23). 
The "stuck in the middle" prescription should, therefore, not 
be taken literally. As mentioned earlier, Porter insisted on 
pointing out the danger for a low-cost producer of not 
offering acceptable quality and service as well as the danger 
for a differentiator of having costs higher than its price 
premium. Moreover, Porter's discussion about the 
sustainability of the competitive advantage is puzzling. The 
author claimed that whether a finn will be able to sustain its 
advantage depends on the source of the advantage, the 
number of distinct sources, and constant improvement and 
upgrading (Porter, 1990, pp.49-53). Porter made a 
distinction between lower-order advantages, such as low 
labor costs or cheap raw material, and higher-order 
advantages such as proprietary process technology or 
product differentiation based on unique products or services, 
arguing that pure cost advantages are often less sustainable 
than differentiation. In a sense, the author appeared to treat 
cost leadership like the poor cousin in the competitive 
strategy family. The underlying message seemed to be that 
differentiation is the best strategy. In keeping with 
Cronshaw et al. (1994)' it could be argued that being able to 
successfully combine differentiation and cost leadership 
would be even better. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
most strategy textbooks now offer a fifth choice (Figure 3), 
namely the "integrated cost leadershipldifferentiation 
strategy" (Coulter, 2002; Hitt et al., 2003) or the "best-cost 
provider strategy" (Thompson & Strickland, 2001)' a 
strategy "in which an organization develops a competitive 
advantage by simultaneously achieving low costs and high 
levels of differentiation (Coulter, 2002, p.228). Interestingly, 
while Southwest is widely recognized for having invented 
the low-cost carrier business model, Hitt et al. (2003) argued 
in the opening of their textbook that Southwest succeeded 
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despite poor economic conditions "because of its integrated customers well and had excellent on-time performance. 
cost leadershipldifferentiation strategy" (p.6). The authors Southwest therefore appeared to simultaneously achieve low 
observed that Southwest offered low fares, like many other costs and differentiation. 
carriers, but also had fewer customer complaints than major 
carriers, were able to attract employees that treated 
Competitive Advantage 






Figure 3. Five competitive strategies 
(Source: Coulter, 2002) 
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Conceptual Framework 
Given this background, this paper sets out to propose a 
conceptual framework that could be used to explore the 
extent to which airline companies successfully pursue the 
best-cost  p rov ide r  (o r  in tegra ted cos t  
leadershipldifferentiation) strategy described above and how 
they manage to resolve the trade-off between low-cost and 
differentiation. 
While cost leadership is self-explanatory - in the airline 
industry it translates into offering the lowest fares - the very 
concept of differentiation is much less precise. 
Differentiators need to be aware of @he key success factors 
in their industry, namely "the product attributes, 
competencies, competitive capabilities, and market 
achievements with the greatest direct bearing on company 
profitability" (Thompson & Strickland, 2001, p. 106) - in 
other words the bases on which customers choose between 
competing airlines - and select the key success factors that 
they will use as bases for differentiation. In the case of the 
airline ihdustry, key success factors that carriers could use 
as bases of differentiation are in-flight comfort service, 
baggage handling, quality of airline employees, internet 
usage, airport proximity, additional services, number of 
destinations offered, and safety. Therefore, carriers pursuing 
a best-cost provider (or integrated cost 
leadershipldifferentiation) strategy would offer lower fares 
than their competitors, together with higher quality air 
travel services. 
We are also interested in assessing the success of the 
business strategy. In order to do so , we will look at both 
fmancial and strategic performance. While fmancial 
performance translates into indicators such as profitability 
and stock price, strategic performance refers to the strength 
of a company business position reflected in the size of its 
market share and the power of its brand. We posit that: 
(1) Airlines that offer lower fares than their 
competitors, together with higher quality air travel 
services and achieve higher financial and strategic 
performance than their rivals have successfully 
implemented the best-cost provider (or integrated 
cost leadershipldifferentiation) strategy. 
(2) Airlines that offer lower fares than their 
competitors, together with higher quality air travel 
services but achieve lower financial and strategic 
performance than their rivals are stuck in the 
middle. 
We now turn to the interesting question of how airlines can 
manage to successfUlly pursue the best-cost provider (or 
integrated cost leadershipldifferentiation) strategy. This 
translates into operations management terms on how the 
Page 40 
trade-offs between low cost and high quality can be 
resolved. Moreover, according to the sand cone model 
reviewed earlier, operational performance trade-offs can be 
avoided by developing lasting capabilities. Discovering high 
performance, low costldifferentiation, carriers' capabilities 
and competencies would therefore lead us to answer the 
second research question. It should be noted we do not make 
any a prior assumptions about the factors explaining 
successful achievement of the best-cost provider (or 
integrated cost leadershipldifferentiation) strategy. Indeed, 
as will be explained later on, our research design will allow 
us to compare, in an open-ended manner, the cases of 
airlines pursuing different business strategies and achieving 
different levels of frnancial and business performance. We 
hope to demonstrate that a number of aviation strategic 
options exist between the "traditional" and "low cost" 
models. 
Research Design 
In keeping with the above research m e w o r k ,  our 
proposed research design would first entail the identification 
of the business strategy that carriers actually pursue. As 
mentioned earlier, the typology of competitive strategies 
introduced by Porter can be used to compare how rivals in 
a given industrial sector position themselves. It would 
therefore be relevant to apply this tool to understand the 
positioning of a sample of airline camers competing on the 
same routes (some could be traditional carriers and others 
could be so-called low cost carriers). Selecting airlines 
competing on same routes controls for travel distance. 
Indeed, it can be argued that what customers value depends 
considerably on the length of the flight. 
After establishing a sample of airlines, objective 
measurement of costs and levels of differentiation will be 
taken. While airline fares can be used as indicators to the 
extent in which airlines are using low cost as a competitive 
advantage, the level of differentiation can be measured using 
indicators such as safety, in-flight services, and on-time 
arrivals. We can choose to concentrate on a single indicator 
of differentiation or create an index using various bases of 
differentiation. Published information on carrier 
performance can be used to evaluate the level of 
differentiation. Alternatively, direct measurement of 
customers' evaluation of airline safety, and in-flight services 
can be taken, by conducting a survey of passengers 
travelling with the selected airlines. This approach, used by 
Kanitakis (2002), entails approaching passengers at the back 
of the check-in desks queue and interviewing them using a 
questionnaire designed to rate the auline on a number of 
differentiation indicators. In keeping with Porter's typology 
of business strategies, this approach allows for the 
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identification of whether or not carriers offer air travel 
services that passengers value and for which they would be 
willing to pay a premium. Moreover, measuring the fares 
offered by the airlines will indicate whether passengers feel 
that they are being offered value without having to pay a 
premium. According to our conceptual m e w o r k ,  this 
beans travelling with an airline pursuing a bestcost 
provider (or integrated cost leadershipldifferentiation) 
strategy. 
The expected results of the above measurement will be 
plotted on a scattergram (Figure 4), composed of the 
following q u h t s :  a group of airlines pursuing a cost 
leadership strategy, a group of airlines pursuiog a 
differentiation strategy, a group of airlines pursuing a best- 
cost provider (or integrated cost leadershipldifferentiation) 
strategy and, finally, a group unable to achieve either low 
cost or differentiation. In comparing airlines' positioning on 
low cost and differentiation, we are making an implicit 
diitinction between intended and realized business 
strategies. The intended business strategy could take the 
form of airline companies' statements regarding their 
positioning, in their annual report or in the business press. 
However, beyond strategic intent, the measurement of fsres 
and airline services quality that we plan to conduct will give 
a measm of the extent to which the intended business 
strategy was realized. 
Low I I I 
Airlines pursuing a cost Airlines pursuing an 
leadership strategy integ- Strategy 
(Some potentkI& stuck 
in the middle) 
High 
Fares 
Airlines unable to 
achieve either a cost 
leadership or a 
differentiafrafron strategy 
Low Service Level 
Airlines pursuing a 
dmmtiation strategy 
High Service Level 
Figure 4. Airlines r e a l i d  business strategies 
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In the next step of our analysis, we are going to 
concentrate on airlines located in the integrated cost 
leadershipldifferentiation quadrant of our scattergram. 
Depending on whether or not all airlines in the research 
sample are public companies, indicators such as profit 
margins, stock price and return on investment will be used 
to evaluate financial performance. Strategic performance 
will be measured with indicators such as market share and 
capacity utilization. In line with our conceptual b e w o r k ,  
measuring financial and strategic performance will allow us 
to distinguish between airlines successfully pursuing the 
bes t -cos t  provider  (o r  imtegrated c o s t  
leadershipldifferentiation) strategy, airlines that are stuck in 
the middle and do not fare better that those located in the 
bottom left quadrant of the Realized Business Strategies 
Scattergram. 
In order to determine how airlines can manage to 
successfully pursue the best-cost provider (or integrated cost 
leadershipldifferentiation) strategy, secondary data will be 
collected to compare airlines having successfully 
implemented the best-cost provider strategy and with 
airlines appearing to be stuck in the middle. In keeping with 
theory on operations strategy, the aim of this comparison is 
to identify airlines' "lasting capabilities" (Ferdows & De 
Meyer, 1990) by analyzing business press articles and 
published case studies to assess how primary and support 
activities are conducted by each airline. This follows from 
Porter's (1 985) assertion that a network of discrete activities 
underlies any competitive advantage (p. 199 1). It is also in 
line with the resource-based view of the firm (Barney, 199 1) 
which highlights the influence of organizational assets and 
capabilities, that are difficult to copy, in the creation of finn 
specific rents. 
Conclusion 
This paper builds on the strategic management and 
operations strategy literature to develop a conceptual 
m e w o r k  that could be used to explore the extent to which 
airline companies successfully pursue the best-cost provider 
(or integrated cost leadershipldifferentiation) strategy, and 
how they manage to resolve the trade-off between low-cost 
and differentiation. Although a lot of work remains to be 
done to operationalize our hmework and apply it to the 
airline industry, we believe that our approach could lead us 
to challenge the current dichotomy between so-called 
traditional and low cost carriers. We argue that it is only 
through objective comparison and positioning that definitive 
conclusions can be reached on the business strategies 
actually pursued by airlines competing on similar routes. 
Moreover, we believe that using an open-ended approach to 
understand how carriers operate, instead of trying to 
measure whether or not they are using the well-known low 
cost recipe, could lead to interesting discoveries. 
The results of this objective comparison of airlines' 
performance and activities will be most valuable, given that 
the airline industry is currently searching for new strategic 
avenues. Many so-called traditional camers have chosen to 
create low-cost subsidiaries to try to compete with newly 
established low cost carriers. However, this strategy has not 
been successfbl and seems to further demonstrate the 
soundness of the "stuck in the middle" argument. 
Interestingly, the difficulty for traditional carriers to house 
low-cost subsidiaries questions the sequence of 
improvement (from quality to dependability to speed to cost 
efficiency) introduced by Ferdows and De Meyer (1 990) in 
their sand cone model. Our proposed research could lead us 
to identifLing a sequence of improvements specific to an 
airline. Perhaps it is more feasible to move away from a cost 
leadership to an integrated cost leadershipldifferentiation 
position than the other way around, which would mean 
succeeding where Laker Airways had failed a number of 
years ago. .) 
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